I read with great interest the recent furore over the nuclear tests conducted by brinkmanship extraordinaire, North Korea. I’ve been wanting to pen down my thoughts, clobbered together by old research and whatever I can recall of articles I’ve read, on the matter.
Since its inception in the 1940s, North Korea has adopted a posture of intransigence and xenophobia. Media perceptions of the regime are overwhelmingly negative, often portraying it as an international pariah or rogue state whose obdurate isolation has caused widespread starvation and the alleged deaths of three million citizens in the 1990s. It is also depicted as a belligerent state which has crafted a deliberate, systematic campaign of connivance and bluster over its nuclear programme, and which has flouted international rules with spectacular brazenness.
Indeed, it is tempting – and almost logical – to conclude that North Korea is simply an irrational nation headed by a deranged dictator with a predilection for military bravado and a blatant disregard for human life.
However, I often ask myself whether there is a different springboard form which we can view its actions rather than relying on the simple assumption of irrationality. Are its actions carefully calibrated? How does it rationalise its seemingly ruinous strategy? Is it possible, to quote Hamlet, “to see the method in (their) madness”?
A Historical Perspective
History serves an instructive prism with which to view the North Korean psyche. In 1945, after North Korea’s liberation from Japan’s colonial clutches, the Communists enjoyed unimpeachable patriotic credentials. Not only did they not plunder poor villages, their guerrillas had put up fierce resistance to the Japanese, helped peasants fight the landlords, weeded out and punished collaborators with the Japanese and rectified social ills such as superstition, illiteracy, gambling and opium addiction. Notably, Japan’s constant harping on the menace of communism led the Koreans to identify communism with Korean resistance and patriotism.
North Korea was also birthed in a tense atmosphere of hostility and mistrust towards its neighbours and the US. Needless to say, Japan was loathed for its cruel and exploitative rule. North Korea also condemned the US for its imperialist designs, and deemed South Korean leaders as lackeys subservient to the US. While it shared ideological comradeship with China and USSR, history was replete with examples of the Soviets and the Chinese selling out the Koreans. For instance, after Japan evacuated her troops from Siberia in 1922, USSR promptly expelled the Korean reactionaries who had fought alongside them against Japan.
With no previous experience of independence, North Korea’s infant steps as a sovereign state were, lamentably, saddled wit the historical baggage of betrayals and subjugation. As such, its paranoia and xenophobia is to some extent the product of its checkered history, and not necessarily one borne of derangement.
Ideological Hot Air
North Korea is a regime buttressed by a vast apparatus of myth and fabrication. Its leaders, Kim Il-Sung and Kim Jung-Il, are deified as paragons of wisdom and infallibility, and are even rumoured to have supernatural powers. Hyperbole and irrefutability are the order of the day – the Kims spoke of the “essential superiority of socialism” and urged the people to “regard it as their moral duty to defend (communism)” even though it is little more than a obsolete ideology.
Myths extolling communism have been the ideological hot air that has staved off the deflation of the North Korean regime. How does one explain its dogged belief in such twaddle? I’ve blogged about this in a different context, but I find it germane here. There are, essentially, two types of truth – 1) the empirical truth, which is proven on empirical grounds and bears relation to reality; and 2) religious truth, which is absolute, incontrovertible and whose veracity is contingent upon one thing: it’s source. It’s like how, in respect of Christians or Muslims, if something is from the Bible or the Koran, then it must be true.
North Korea’s perception of truth bears greater semblance to religious truth than empirical truth. Their beliefs are assumed a priori, because it is almost impossible for them to test their beliefs empirically. Simply put, they have no alternate truth to base their beliefs on.
A Zero-Sum Proposition
But why would, North Korean leaders, who are presumably more attuned to the external world, propagate such an outmoded worldview? The likely explanation is that the leaders are only too acutely aware than opening up North Korean society would unleash the centrifugal forces that would ultimately precipitate the collapse of the regime. They may have gleaned some lessons from how Gorbachev’s experimental policies of glasnost and perestroika discharged a tide of change that splintered the Soviet Union, as Coca-cola and jeans stormed into Soviet markets and the people clamoured for greater political liberties.
In other words, isolation is paramount to survival. The political and social constructs of North Korea are inimical to the notion of reform and modernity. To open the country and allow comparisons between North Korea and the external world would be political suicide. Moral commentary aside, given the ramifications, it is perfectly rational to remain hermetic and preserve the leadership’s unfettered power.
Racing towards the Nuclear Finishing Line
The North Korea nuclear crisis has been characterised by a leitmotif of deceit, flagellation and bluster. There are many theories purporting to explain why North Korea covets nuclear weapons. It may desire them as a bargaining chip, as a hallmark of prestige and to arm-twist the US for economic benefits. But more meaningfully, given that it cannot challenge US military preponderance in conventional warfare, nuclear weapons remain its best bet to develop asymmetric counters to a US which it cannot hope to defeat in symmetric warfare.
The US’ policy of pre-emptive warfare and regime change in Afghanistan and Iraq would presumably be radioactive to the North Koreans. Military prowess and the ability to wreak considerable damage to US interests would insure against confrontation by an increasingly hawkish Bush administration. As Krugman observed in 2003, “the best self-preservation strategy for Mr Kim is to be dangerous.”
However, it would be erroneous to whitewash North Korea. Firstly, the 2002 nuclear crisis 2002 was not caused by a change in Washington’s stance – the crisis arose when North Korea was caught cheating by erecting an illegal uranium plant. It remains highly doubtful that North Korea would reveal the programme had it not been uncovered.
Bereft of Allies
Finally, there are no allies which can meaningfully engage North Korea. China, whilst being the arbiter of the 6 Power Talks, is wooing two of Pyongyang’s biggest adversaries – the US and the Republic of Korea (ROK). Given China’s burgeoning ties with these nations, future Chinese policy is likely to be aligned with the strategic interests of Washington and Seoul, which implies that Pyongyang would be increasingly marginalised. Already, China's shrill rhetoric over the recent tests signalled this shift. More importantly, a feeble Chinese response towards North Korea may embolden Japan to go nuclear herself, which would be anathema to Beijing.
Russia remains at best, a fair weather friend. Further, the prospects for engagement with Japan remain bleak. Historical animosity notwithstanding, Japan is deeply suspicious of North Korea and its reactions to escalations of tensions have been largely alarmist. The ROK is also an unlikely ally, for Pyongyang continues to insist on the illegitimacy of the ROK government as a puppet regime installed by the US and has missiles facing the south across the Demilitarised Zone.
As such, mired in extreme poverty, bereft of allies and proffering a bankrupt ideology, North Korea comes across as an enigma that confounds and exasperates. It is easy to dismiss it as a bellicose, anachronistic regime that has stirred for itself this cup of bitterness through its irrational pursuit of ruinous policies. To a certain extent that is true. Yet it bears to remember that Pyongyang leadership cannot engage in meaningful reform without sealing the nails in its own coffin. Reform is fatal to the regime.
As such, it is more apt to see North Korea not as a product of irrationality, but a case of a rational mind operating in a highly aberrant environment. To quote Bradner’s astute observation, “Herein lies the tragic dilemma of North Korea’s existence. What is medicine for the populace is poison to the regime, and the interests of the rulers and and ruled are opposed as in any ancient despotism.”